Napoleon's West Indian Policy, The Laclerc Secret Instructions And The Louisiana Purchase

I have tried to establish that the French West Indian policy was not an invention of Napoleon's, but something he inherited from the Directorate. Perhaps the clearest evidence that Napoleon's strategy called for the San Domingue-center plan, and not the linear plot, comes from his secret instructions to Laclerc. (11) The primary aim of the instructions is to tell Laclerc how Napoleon wants Toussaint subdued, slowly, with flattery to lower his guard, and then with ruthlessness. This is exactly what Laclerc seems to have achieved. Napoleon's primary mistake was to think that the elimination of Toussaint was the immediate end of the revolution.
But, more to the point of this story is that the secret instructions make clear that Napoleon was out to re-establish Saint-Domingue in all her prior glory. This he recognized required the reintroduction of slavery and the complete return of the old regime.

He tells Leclerc:
"The Spaniards, the British and the Americans are equally worried to see a Black Republic. The admiral and the major general will write memorandums to the neighboring establishments in order to let them know the goal of the government, the common advantage for the Europeans to destroy the Black Rebellion and the hope to be seconded." (Roloff, p. 249)

Later on he is more specific:
"Commerce must, during the 1st, 2nd and 3rd periods be accessible to Americans, but after the 3rd period, Frenchmen only will be admitted and the ancient rules from before the Revolution will be put back into force." (Roloff, p. 252-253)
In order for France to recapture the grandeur that was Saint-Domingue, Napoleon needed to put down the black rebellion, reestablish slavery, and equally importantly, refuse all trade with Britain and the United States. When Saint-Domingue was producing her fabulous wealth for France it was because the exclusif was in effect, that is, Saint-Domingue was required to trade exclusively with France, both for her imports and exports.
Certainly Louisiana played an important role in Napoleon's policy. As Henry Adams says:
"St. Domingo, like all the West Indies, suffered as a colony under a serious disadvantage, being dependent for its supplies on the United States--a dangerous neighbor both by its political example and its commercial and maritime rivalry with the mother country. The First Consul hoped to correct this evil by substituting Louisiana for the United States as a source of supplies for St. Domingo."&bbsp; (Adams, "Napoleon," p. 124)

Napoleon's vision is a Saint-Domingue-centered vision. She was to be the great producer of wealth, reverting to her slave status. Louisiana was important to the plan, but Louisiana was relegated to the role of an agricultural supplier for the hungry slaves of Saint-Domingue, and as a front-line protector from allowing the United States a trade foot in the door. Nonetheless, Napoleon's West Indian policy looks first and foremost to Saint-Domingue.

Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against the linear plot and for the Saint-Domingue-center plot is the Louisiana Purchase. Napoleon was soundly defeated in Saint-Domingue and Haiti was born of the ashes of that battle. But, if Louisiana had been the actual target, then Napoleon could have extricated himself earlier and by-passed Saint-Domingue to continue on toward his main target. He would have reasoned that it was not Toussaint who defeated him, but yellow fever, which was a favorite explanations of many white racists. (see note # 7 again). He would have given up on Saint- Domingue as unfit for Frenchmen, and moved on to Louisiana. What he did in fact, however, was to sell Louisiana as soon as it became clear that he was not going to retake Saint-Domingue. What's the point in an excellent supply depot if there's nothing to supply.

Henry Adams gives evidence that Napoleon was considering selling Louisiana as early as April, 1803, seven months before the French finally surrendered in Haiti. (Adams HISTORY, p. 329) Adams sums up the situation succinctly:
"Without that island the system had hands, feet, and even a head, but no body. Of what use was Louisiana, when France had clearly lost the main colony which Louisiana was meant to feed and fortify?... Not only had the island of St. Domingo been ruined by the war, its plantations destroyed, its labor paralyzed, and its population reduced to barbarism...but...the army dreaded service in St. Domingo, where certain death awaited every soldier; the expense was frightful; a year of war had consumed fifty thousand men and money in vast amounts, with no other result than to prove that at least as many men and as much money would be still needed before any return could be expected for so lavish an expenditure. In Europe war could be made to support war; in St. Domingo peace alone could but slowly repair some part of this frightful waste." (Adams, HISTORY, P. 311-312).

The deal to sell the Louisiana Territory was well underway in the last days of the Leclerc expedition, and was actually concluded before the French left Saint-Domingue, though the official sale, like the official birth of Haiti, is in 1804.

Haiti's Contribution to the United States
The interesting and ironic part of this story is that what at first seems to be the weaker and less glorious of the plots is actually the stronger and more glorious position for Haiti. On the linear plot theory, Napoleon was headed for the United States through Louisiana with a quick stop over in Saint-Domingue. Then, Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian masses stopped the French dead in their tracks. The French, beaten and discouraged, spared the United States and returned home.
But notice that what makes this story interesting is the assumption that the most important entity is the United States and not Haiti. What is glorious is that the tiny, insignificant nation of Haiti saved the important great giant with its unlikely victory over the French forces.

However, on the Saint-Domingue-center theory, Haiti is the key and center of Napoleon's whole West Indian strategy. Louisiana, which recall is not the United States, but a French colony, is an important supply depot, but secondary to the whole plot. The United States is a competitive nation, trying to cut into France's trade relations with its richest colony.
Certainly the United States feared France's presence in Louisiana, especially with the imperialist Napoleon Bonaparte on the throne. But it was the lost trade with Saint-Domingue that most frightened the U.S.

Jefferson recognized this. He was himself a Republican and not a Federalist, and was president during Napoleon's attack on Saint-Domingue. He seems not to have feared that Napoleon had designs the United States. Nonetheless he had a clear idea of the interrelation between Louisiana, Saint-Domingue, France and the U.S. On April 18, 1802 he wrote Edward Livingstone, American Minister in Paris, that New Orleans "...is the one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy...The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark...From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." (Logan, P.134)

Jefferson was confident that the French would not succeed in Saint- Domingue, and supplied Toussaint with arms, munitions and food, regarding him, as the Federalist linear plot did too, as the first line of defense against Napoleonic aggression. But the aggression Jefferson feared was not a direct threat to United States territorial integrity, but an undesired and untenable French presence in Louisiana. He believed that Toussaint would put up considerable resistance, and he counted on pressing affairs in Europe to turn Napoleon from his West Indian policy.
Thus on the Saint-Domingue-center theory Haiti becomes much more important than it would otherwise. It is recognized by Napoleon, and the French Directorate before him, as the most important factor of its West Indian's policy, and more important than Louisiana. At the same time, the heroic fighting of the Haitians presents Louisiana to the United States on a silver platter. Consequently, the part of the story which the Haitians so love to acknowledge -- their contribution to the well being of the United States -- is well preserved.

Finally, this view emphasizes that in the relative importance of nations, there was a time when Haiti was not important for what she did or didn't do for the big brother across the gulf stream, but extremely important in her own right, sought after by Napoleon himself. The seemingly "lesser" view becomes the more significant when viewed from this perspective.

FOOTNOTES
At times when technically referring to the colony of San Domingue, I will use the name Haiti. I am quite aware that Haiti was officially born on Jan. 1, 1804. However, she was effectively independent from 1798, except for the brief period after Toussaint's so-called retirement. At times in my story where the text calls for the emphasis that the action was one taken by the independent forces, I will use the name Haiti or Haitians, even before the legal date arrives.
Whether the plot was to move from New Orleans to Philadelphia or to Washington depends in which administration one locates the plot. For most of John Adams' presidency the capital was Philadelphia. Washington became the seat of government in July, 1800, just before Thomas Jefferson became president.
Some of the historians who seem to lean strongly toward the linear plot theory are: Robert and Nancy Heinl, Carl Lokke, Wenda Parkinson and Charles Tansill.
When the slaves first rebelled in August of 1791 they were not asking for emancipation, but only an additional day each week to cultivate their garden plots. (Korngold, p. 29)

Napoleon had already decided upon his West Indian strategy, which was, in this sense, much more important than the person of Toussaint Louverture. However, just a few days after Napoleon had ordered the mounting of the expedition against San Domingue, General Stevens arrived in Paris with Toussaint's printed constitution, naming him Governor General for life and virtually making San Domingue a free nation with only the loosest ties to France. This constitution, and particularly the fact that it had already been printed and distributed, was too much for Napoleon, who could brook no threat to his own dominance. He wanted the head of this man whom he called "the gilded African."

It is interesting to note, however, that in 1799 Commissioner Roume did in fact send agents to Jamaica to stir up the slaves. One agent, Sasportas, died a heroic death in Jamaica and, ironically, the British became frightened of Toussaint! (Korngold, p. 177-178)
Perhaps one of the most difficult and interesting scholarly questions concerning the Haitian Revolution is what was the relative impact of Toussaint's leadership and the Haitian fighters and what was the impact of yellow fever? This is a problem which has not been adequately settled in the literature.

The British secret convention with Toussaint also includes this prohibition against a Haitian navy. (Montague, p. 38) Also, when Jefferson proposed independence under 3 powers early in 1802, the French Minister of Marine, Pichon, quotes Jefferson as saying: "Provided that the Negroes are not permitted to possess a navy, we can allow them without danger to exist and we can moreover continue with them very lucrative commercial relations." (Logan, p. 126). However, Logan seems to think the Haitian Revolution was more of a threat than did either Britain or the United States. As long as Haiti could have no navy they seemed to believe her servile revolution could be contained. Logan, waxing eloquent about the impact of the revolution, places it much higher on the historical scale of importance: "It would perhaps not be too much to say that the specter of a free Negro Republic that owed its independence to a successful slave revolt frightened slave holding countries as much as the shadow of Bolshevist Russia alarmed capitalistic countries in 1917." (Logan, p. 72)

Montague's description is the best I have read of this alleged "discovery." "How, indeed, had the Federalists hoped to hold the South in line while they negotiated with the 'First of the Blacks?' They 'discovered' that France had ordered an invasion of the Southern States from Saint Domingue, to carry thither the tide of black revolt, that Toussaint had refused to obey, and that Rigaud had undertaken the task. Considering the actual situation in Saint Domingue, the idea was fantastic. Even Stevens, who had it from a source probably inspired by Toussaint himself, could take it seriously only by supposing that the Directory planned to make South Carolina a second Egypt, to rid itself of Toussaint as it had rid itself of Bonapart. Nevertheless, the South was asked to believe that Louverture was a true ally, Rigaud a dangerous enemy." (Montague, p. 39.) [Note that Steven's remark about the 'second Egypt' was made before Napoleon returned to France and staged his coup d'etat.]

Lear was not a Federalist and had replaced Edward Stevens in Cape Francois on April 28, 1801. The new Secretary of State, James Madison, had replaced Stevens to lessen the Federalist influence in San Dominguan policy. (Logan, p. 14)
These secret instructions were, for a long time unknown or lost. Finally a German historian, Gustave Roloff, turned them up and presented them as an appendix to his book DIE KOLONIALPOLITIK NAPOLEONS I. The translations which I use in the two selections in the body of the paper were made by Jacques C. Chicoineau, retired professor of French at Webster University.